Viral Cases and Invisible Victims: Can Media Attention Distort Which Cases Receive Institutional Priority?

Viral Cases and Invisible Victims: Can Media Attention Distort Which Cases Receive Institutional Priority?

By Shashi Ranjan

LLB 2nd Year Student, University of Allahabad

Intern, Adv. Omkar Pardeshi and Associates

Abstract

High-profile POCSO cases that attract intense media coverage and public discussion often become the subject of closer institutional scrutiny. At the same time, large numbers of comparable cases that remain largely invisible continue to experience delay. This raises an important practical and constitutional question: can media visibility influence the urgency with which some cases are monitored or listed? The article examines the statutory design of POCSO Special Courts, Fast Track Special Courts and exclusive POCSO courts, the timelines in Section 35 of the POCSO Act, the rights of the child, the parent or trusted person and the accused, and the continuing problem of pendency. It argues that while media attention can draw institutional focus to particular cases, any claim of systematic differential priority requires careful empirical examination. Priority should rest on transparent criteria linked to vulnerability and law rather than on the volume of coverage. The piece ends with realistic reform suggestions.

Introduction

Consider two children who have suffered sexual offences of broadly similar seriousness. In one case the facts become widely known through media reports and public discussion. Status reports are called for, listing appears more regular, and agencies face public scrutiny. In the other case the facts remain largely private. Investigation and trial proceed more slowly, and the statutory timelines slip. The practical question is whether the justice system responds with equal urgency to both, or whether visibility itself can shape institutional attention.

The POCSO Act was enacted to give every child a specialised, time-bound and sensitive process. Special Courts were designated for this purpose. The Union Fast Track Special Courts scheme was later introduced to reduce pendency in rape and POCSO matters. Exclusive POCSO courts were created within that scheme so that some courts would handle only these cases. The design is clear on paper. The difficulty appears when institutional energy appears to concentrate on a few high-visibility matters while many ordinary cases continue to wait.

This article examines that gap. It begins with the legal framework, distinguishes the three kinds of courts, sets out the rights that must be balanced, looks at delay and implementation, and considers the risk that media attention may influence priority. It ends with reform suggestions aimed at consistency rather than at silencing legitimate reporting.

Background and Legal Framework

Section 28 of the POCSO Act requires the State Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, to designate a Court of Session as a Special Court. These are the statutory POCSO Special Courts. Their purpose is to try offences under the Act with procedures suited to child witnesses.

The Union Fast Track Special Courts scheme, launched in 2019 as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme and supported in part by the Nirbhaya Fund, created an additional layer of courts focused on the expeditious disposal of pending rape and POCSO cases. Within this network some courts function as exclusive POCSO courts and try only matters under the Act. As reported by the Union Government, 775 Fast Track Special Courts, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, were functional across 29 States and Union Territories as of 30 April 2026. The scheme has been temporarily extended until 30 September 2026.

The three categories therefore serve related but distinct roles. POCSO Special Courts derive their statutory basis from Section 28 of the Act. Fast Track Special Courts operate under the centrally sponsored scheme for expeditious disposal of rape and POCSO cases. Exclusive POCSO courts are Fast Track Special Courts dedicated specifically to POCSO matters. The precise arrangement in each State depends on consultation between the State Government and the High Court.

Section 35 of the Act sets two separate requirements. The evidence of the child is to be recorded within thirty days of the Special Court taking cognizance; reasons must be recorded for any delay. The trial is to be completed, as far as possible, within one year from the date of cognizance. The “as far as possible” language is important. The provision creates a statutory expectation of expedition, but it does not automatically invalidate a trial that exceeds one year or create an automatic statutory remedy for every breach.

Constitutionally, the right to a reasonably speedy trial has been recognised as part of Article 21 since Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar and was elaborated by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. Article 14 requires equality before the law. If similarly situated cases receive materially different institutional treatment solely because one has attracted media attention, that may raise concerns of arbitrariness. The constitutional analysis would, however, require examination of whether the differential treatment has an objective and legally relevant justification such as age, safety risk, evidence preservation or statutory deadlines.

Procedure under the Act is built around the child. Evidence is recorded in camera. The child is not to be exposed to the accused while testifying. Support persons may be appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2020 to assist the child through investigation and trial. Medical examination must respect dignity. At the same time the accused retains the ordinary rights of a fair trial. The parent or trusted person of the child may receive procedural assistance and information under the Act and Rules. These protections must coexist with the accused’s fair-trial rights.

Main Analysis: Visibility, Scrutiny and Delay

High-profile cases that generate sustained media coverage and public discussion frequently become the subject of closer institutional scrutiny. Higher courts may call for status reports. Listing may become more regular. Investigating agencies face public pressure. This is not always improper. Public attention can expose delay and compel institutions to act.

The difficulty begins when the same level of urgency appears to be withheld from cases that never become public. At the end of 2025, 2,45,579 cases were pending before Fast Track Special Courts dealing with rape and POCSO matters. The figure represents overall FTSC pendency, not POCSO cases alone. While disposal rates of POCSO cases improved in many States in 2025, the absolute number of pending cases remains substantial. Many children still wait well beyond the one-year goal set by Section 35.

In In Re: Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents, SMW (Crl.) No. 1/2019, the Supreme Court took cognizance of systemic concerns arising from media reports of rising child sexual offences. The Court issued directions for the creation of exclusive courts in districts with high pendency and stressed the need for specialised capacity and compliance with statutory timelines. These directions treat the problem as systemic rather than as a series of individual responses to publicity.

Media reporting is itself regulated. Section 23 of the POCSO Act prohibits disclosure of the identity of the child. In Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, the Supreme Court emphasised that media may report sexual offences against children without revealing the identity of the victim and should avoid sensationalisation. The Court made clear that reportage must be sensitive and that the dignity of the child requires strong protection.

Rights of the Child, Parent or Trusted Person, and the Accused

The child’s rights stand at the centre: protection from further trauma, privacy, prompt recording of evidence, and a trial that is both fair and child-sensitive. The parent or trusted person may receive procedural assistance, information and support under the Act and the 2020 Rules, including the assistance of a support person. The accused has the full set of fair-trial rights. None of these rights expands or shrinks according to the amount of media coverage a case receives.

When institutional attention is influenced by publicity, two risks appear. The child’s statutory entitlement to timely process may become dependent on external attention. In cases that remain invisible, delay can become normalised. In cases that become highly visible, the pressure of public expectation may create a risk that investigation or trial preparation is perceived as being driven by public expectations rather than by ordinary procedural standards. A system that applies the same standards of urgency and care regardless of media volume protects all three sets of interests more consistently.

Critical Analysis

The present pattern raises three linked concerns.

First, equality may come under strain. If two children in comparable circumstances receive materially different institutional responses solely because one case became visible, questions of arbitrary differential treatment under Article 14 can arise. The analysis must still examine whether any difference is justified by objective factors such as age, safety risk or evidence preservation.

Second, the quality of process can be affected. Intense public scrutiny may create pressure for rapid visible action. The absence of scrutiny may allow delay to settle in as the normal state of affairs.

Third, public confidence can be affected if citizens begin to believe that justice moves mainly for those who can generate coverage.

Existing tools are incomplete. Section 35 sets timelines but does not create an automatic, victim-centred consequence when they are missed. The Fast Track Special Courts scheme has increased capacity, yet overall pendency remains high. High Courts possess supervisory and constitutional jurisdiction that can be invoked where delay or procedural failure warrants intervention; the extent to which such intervention occurs proactively rather than after public attention varies by case and jurisdiction.

Media attention is not illegitimate. It can reveal systemic failure and demand accountability. The concern arises when attention becomes a substitute for criteria based on the age of the child, safety risk, the danger of evidence loss and the statutory deadlines themselves.

Realistic Reform Options

Several practical steps can reduce the risk of selective urgency.

High Courts could consider publishing objective, transparent criteria for priority listing of POCSO and other vulnerable-victim cases. Those criteria should focus on the age of the child, risk to safety or evidence, statutory timelines and any special vulnerability. The volume of media coverage should not itself be a listed factor.

Case-management systems could be designed to flag cases that have already crossed the thirty-day evidence timeline or the one-year trial goal, so that review happens automatically rather than only when a case is in the news.

Exclusive POCSO courts and Fast Track Special Courts need sustained funding, enough trained support persons under the 2020 Rules, and Special Public Prosecutors, together with regular data that measure performance against Section 35.

Media organisations can continue to be reminded of the statutory bar on identity disclosure and the duty to avoid coverage that re-traumatises the child. Depending on the nature of the reporting, statutory restrictions, court directions and applicable regulatory principles may become relevant.

Finally, data on disposal rates, average time to recording of evidence and average time to judgment should be published in a form that allows comparison against the statutory goals. Performance can then be judged by compliance with law rather than by the presence or absence of public attention.

These steps would not remove legitimate public interest in individual cases. They would make urgency a function of the child’s needs and the requirements of the statute rather than a function of visibility.

Conclusion

Media attention can bring delay into the open and press institutions to act. It cannot become the main filter that decides which children receive timely process and which continue to wait. POCSO Special Courts, Fast Track Special Courts and exclusive POCSO courts were created so that every child would have access to a specialised and time-bound system. That purpose is weakened if institutional priority appears to follow the volume of coverage rather than the vulnerability of the child and the clear directions of the Act.

The practical question asked at the beginning does not yet have a fully settled empirical answer. High-profile cases often attract greater scrutiny. Whether media attention systematically causes faster listing or preferential treatment across the board requires careful empirical examination. What the constitutional and statutory framework does require is that urgency rest on published, reviewable criteria that treat every child by the same standards. Only then does timely justice stop being an exception that appears after a case turns viral and become the ordinary expectation of the system. Invisible victims are entitled to the same institutional commitment as those whose stories reach the public. That is the standard a justice system must meet if it is to take the rights of every child seriously.

References

1. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sections 23, 28, 33, 35 and 36. Full text: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2079/1/A2012-32.pdf

2. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2020 (support persons and related procedural assistance).

3. In Re: Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents, SMW (Crl.) No. 1/2019 (Supreme Court directions on exclusive courts and systemic capacity).

4. Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 (guidelines on non-disclosure of identity and sensitive media reporting).

5. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 (speedy trial under Article 21).

6. Department of Justice / Press Information Bureau data on Fast Track Special Courts (as of 30 April 2026): 775 functional FTSCs including 398 exclusive POCSO courts; scheme extended to 30 September 2026. See: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2289464

7. Parliamentary data on FTSC pendency (end of 2025): 2,45,579 cases pending before FTSCs dealing with rape and POCSO matters (overall figure, not POCSO alone).

8. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.