Introduction
For centuries, jurists have debated the relationship between law and morality. Natural law theorists, particularly St.Thomas Aquinas argued that “a law without moral content is a perversion of law” while legal positivists such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin rejected the principle because of its vague nature. They believed that the idea of legal positivism emphasised the separation of law and morality. Yet long before this debate took shape in Western jurisprudence, Indian thought grappled with a similar dilemma through the idea of dharma. This brings me to an important question : Is dharma merely another word for law? Is it morality? Or does it represent an altogether different normative ideal?
To explore this question, we must turn our attention to two influential works of Indian literature – Mahabharata and Ponniyin Selvan. Having read these two literary classics, I was inspired to compare these works. They belong to different literary traditions yet they repeatedly confront their characters with situations in which legal duty, political necessity, and justice point in different directions. This article approaches these literary works as normative texts that help us explore the jurisprudential dilemma.
Exploration through Case Studies
The Mahabharata presents the exploration of conflicting duties as it does not ask its characters to choose between right or wrong; instead it confronts competing obligations. The game of dice between the Pandavas and Kauravas is an excellent example of the tension between legal compliance and morality. Yudhishthira accepts the game and honours the outcome yet the consequences invite a difficult question : Can adherence to a legal framework still result in a failure of justice? Similarly, Bheeshma’s silence during the humiliation of Draupadi raises the same dilemma. If Mahabharata visits these questions in the context of dharma, Ponniyin Selvan revisits them within the frame of politics and succession.
Consider Arulmozhivarman. Although he possesses a legitimate claim to the Chola throne, he repeatedly upholds the welfare of the kingdom over his personal ambitions. His conduct suggests that the legitimacy of political authority cannot rest solely upon hereditary succession or legal entitlement; it must also derive from a ruler’s moral responsibility towards the State and its people. In contrast to Arulmozhivarman, whose decisions reflect responsibility, Nandini embodies the consequences of justice pursued outside institutional frameworks. Motivated by personal vengeance, she seeks to reshape political events through deception, manipulation, and revenge. Through Nandini, Ponniyin Selvan illustrates that morality, when separated from legal restraint, may itself become a source of injustice.
Through the characters of Yudhishthira, Bheeshma, Arulmozhivarman and Nandini, both works reveal the limitations of viewing law and morality as independent and competing ideals. Law without moral reflection may legitimise injustice, while morality unconstrained by law risks descending into subjectivity and private vengeance. Dharma, therefore, is neither synonymous with law nor morality; rather it is a normative ideal that reconciles legal duty and ethical responsibility.
Conclusion
The questions raised by these narratives are strikingly relevant in contemporary jurisprudence. Courts continue to confront cases where strict adherence to legal rules appears to conflict with morality, while societies grapple with whether moral outrage can justify departures from established legal processes. Rather than offering definitive answers, these narratives remind us that justice often lies not in choosing between law and morality, but in understanding how each must inform the other.
Written by Kathirmathie V, BBA LL.B(Hon.) Student, Symbiosis Law School,Pune
