- Introduction
Orbital servicing may involve activities such as inspection, repairs, re-fueling, extending lifetime, assembly, repositioning and disposal. These activities will enable the retention of useful space assets while cutting down on the replacement of functional satellites. Additionally, the activities will enable one spacecraft to rendezvous, dock, command and change orbits of the other. The legal issue that arises is not only whether the servicing craft is permitted to operate in space, but also its authority to engage a specific target.
Suppose there is a servicer licensed in State A that contacts a satellite belonging to a firm from State B but registered in State C. This satellite is being run by an independent firm under a contract. The servicer claims that repositioning is necessary to minimize the likelihood of collision, yet the servicer lacks an express authorization from the operator, owner, or the State of registration. However, regardless of the motivation behind the action taken by the servicer, such an act may disrupt communication, alter the orbit of the satellite, or interfere with any other objects.
The essential point is that the authority to perform a servicing operation according to the licensing regime of one State does not, by itself, constitute an authorization to interfere with a satellite of some other operator. On the other hand, the treaties have no universal consent requirement for every observation or proximity operation. The crucial thing in the analysis is to make a distinction between mere observation and physical or operational interference.
- The treaty framework and its distinct functions
Outer Space Treaty (OST)
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the starting point. The first article guarantees the freedom of exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, while the second article prohibits national appropriation. Neither of these articles creates a territorial zone surrounding the satellite or a right to seize control of the spacecraft of another space operator. The sixth article ensures that the States are internationally liable for any national activity in outer space, including activities carried out by non-governmental organizations, and obliges them to authorize and continuously supervise these organizations. [1, arts. I-II, VI-VII]
Article VIII states that jurisdiction and control remain with the State on whose registry the object is carried during outer space flight. Additionally, it indicates that there is no effect on the ownership of the object because of the fact that it was in outer space or came back to Earth. All of this is important for servicing purposes, however, these considerations do not answer all questions regarding which persons have authorization for the mission. The process of registration does not indicate the owner of the object, contractual operator, commander of the object or authorized government officer. There is no such universal procedure provided for in Article VIII. [1, art. VIII]
Under Article IX, States Parties are obliged to conduct activities in outer space “with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States Parties to the Treaty.” In addition, prior to the carrying out of an activity or experiment by a State or any of its nationals in the case where a State considers that such activity may result in potential harmful interference with the activities of other States Parties in the exploration and use of outer space, “appropriate international consultations shall be conducted.” A State Party may ask for consultations in the case where it considers that the planned activities of another State Party may cause harmful interference. [1, art. IX]
The Registration Convention plays another function that is somewhat connected but still different. A state of registry is described as a launching state which registers the object on its own registry. In case there are several states of launching, then the launching states will determine which of them will carry out registration of the object considering Article VIII and without any prejudice to the appropriate agreements between them concerning jurisdiction and control. So, the Convention promotes clarification of the registration and does not solve the problem of private ownership or authority of all individuals who participate in the servicing. [2, arts. I–II]
The Liability Convention provides for the determination of specific forms of damages and also the procedure of an interstate claim in case of their occurrence. It does not regulate all disputes caused by an unauthorized approach, interruption of servicing and other interference. [3, arts. I–V, VIII–XIX]
III. Consent and the scope of permissible servicing
The significance of any method in terms of its legality cannot be assessed in relation to the distance alone. No general minimum distance between spacecraft is defined in the treaties. While remote sensing might not be governed by the requirement of prior permission of the operator of the target under a particular provision in a particular treaty, this does not exclude the application of the respective obligations with respect to due regard, harmful interference, national authorization, security or telecommunications.
Any attempt at docking, grappling, refueling, command uploading, attitude change, or relocation of the satellite involves greater intrusion. Such actions could have influence upon the configuration, operation and control of the target. Article VIII is especially relevant in cases of interventions seeking to alter control over the registered object; Article IX is directly relevant in the case of risks associated with such interests and activities of other States.
The proper course for a cooperative mission is the securing of specific, verifiable and mission level permission for the tasks to be undertaken from those who have control over the target in space and obtaining of any state authorization necessary under the national law. The agreement shall specify the two vehicles, the authorized tasks, the access to physical equipment and software, the command authority, duration of access, right of termination, emergency separation, cybersecurity, insurance, indemnity, allocation of risks and retention of evidences. The servicer shall ascertain the authority of the person granting permission to undertake the specified task, taking into account the constraints arising from ownership, lease, financing, regulatory approvals and operations agreement.
An inactive or unresponsive satellite does not constitute abandonment of that object. Article VIII preserves ownership irrespective of the object being found in outer space. There is no salvage law contained in the space treaties that would allow a satellite to be seized or removed on the ground of inactivity. In case of emergency action, separate analysis is required.
- A three-State hypothetical and divided authority
Let us consider the case of a company registered in State A, which maintains a servicing vehicle on the basis of licence from State A. The company operating the target satellite is located in State B. State C is the State of registration. The target is being operated by a contractor with the consent of the owner of the satellite. A collision alert reveals that the two objects will pass each other at close proximity.
The State A Licence decides on whether the servicer has authorization from the State A legislation to carry out its own space activities. In itself, the licence does not authorize the modification of the State C-registered target nor does it constitute evidence of the agreement by the owner or the operator. The owner in State B could be the person having the rights to the property or the contract whereas the operator is the person who controls the operations according to the terms of the owner and the service contract. State C keeps the jurisdiction and control conferred under Article VIII for the registered object, but the Article VIII does not provide the exact procedure to follow or the private entity that could give the consent. [1, arts. VI, VIII–IX; 2, art. II(2)]
If there is a possibility that the maneuver of the servicing spacecraft may result in harmful interference in the activities of another State Party that are being carried out peacefully in outer space, then under Article IX, it is incumbent upon State A to hold international consultations if the conditions set forth by the Treaty are satisfied. State C or any other concerned State Party can also request for international consultations under the same conditions. Such consultations do not amount to private permission from the owner of the spacecraft and the owner’s permission will not discharge the States from their treaty obligations.
In this case, the fact that needs to change is that the operating contractor is from State D, and the owner still operates from State B and the satellite is still registered in State C. Now, the servicer will need to determine who can issue commands, if the owner has reserved the right to give any approval, whether or not there is any provision within the operator’s contract allowing third-party servicing, and what are the jurisdictional capacities of each of these States with respect to the private entity involved. The licensing of State A, the ownership of State B, registry of State C and regulation of State D answers different questions. One of these relations cannot replace the other automatically.
This is a good illustration showing why it is important not to confuse “owner,” “operator,” “State of registry,” “launching State” and “licensing State.” The terms may sometimes coincide, but sometimes they may refer to different States and different persons. The contract can divide command authority, risks, and responsibility among the parties, but it cannot alter the State’s international responsibilities according to the relevant treaties.
- Interference, due regard and State responsibility
Interference may happen in several ways: through physical contact or collision, an unwanted change of orbit, radio-frequency interference, unauthorized instructions, or data interference. These types of interference may not be subject to the same rules of international law. Physical interference poses the issue of the right to interfere and its impact on the issue of jurisdiction and control. Radio-frequency interference is to be assessed in the context of the relevant International Telecommunication Union regime. The same holds true with cyber interference and data interference which should not automatically be considered as radio-frequency interference. [1, arts. VI, VIII–IX; 4, art. 45]
The due regard requirement under Article IX should be fulfilled prior to the damage caused. Risk assessments, notices, uncertainty analysis in orbit, communication channels, separation operations and communications procedures could serve as evidence of due regard to be considered during the analysis of the case. Such actions can be considered to be practical risk management measures, which cannot be regarded as being explicitly required by Article IX. The necessary measures will vary depending on the interference anticipated, the information available, and the capabilities of the objects involved. [1, art. IX]
Article VI entails authorization and supervision of non-governmental space activities of the relevant State Party. This requirement should not be confused with attribution of acts under general international law of State responsibility. Articles on State Responsibility prepared by International Law Commission deal with issues of attribution, breach and reparation as a general approach depending on the underlying primary rules and any particular regime. Conduct of a private company would not necessarily be considered attributable to a State according to any of the rules of attribution; additionally, Article VI creates treaty obligations for States regarding national activities. [1, art. VI; 5, arts. 2, 4–11, 12, 31, 55]
Article 45 of ITU Constitution obliges Member States to ensure that the stations under their jurisdiction are operated in such manner that they do not result in harmful interference to radio services and communications made in accordance with Radio Regulations. This article concerns radio transmissions only; it is not a general legal framework for docking, towing or cyber operations. [4, art. 45]
- Liability, fault and compensable damage
The Liability Convention divides harm that takes place on the ground or to the aircraft and harm that takes place elsewhere. According to Article II, launching state is absolutely liable for damage caused by a space object on the territory of the Earth or to the aircraft while it is flying. According to Article III, damage caused elsewhere to the space object of another launching state, or to persons or objects on board such space object, is to be dealt with on the principle of fault liability.
The Convention refers to “damage” as meaning the death of any person, injury or impairment of health, or loss of or damage to property. The Convention, however, does not explicitly address every case involving the interruption of satellite services, lost revenue, maneuvers, or diminished economic value in cases where there is no physical damage. This would mean that it would be too sweeping a statement to assume that all of these losses will necessarily be recoverable under the Convention or that none of them will ever be recoverable through any other avenue.
A Convention claim is made by a State through diplomacy. According to Article X, in general, there should be a claim made within a period of one year depending on its provisions regarding knowledge of damage or launching State and due diligence. Article XI does not mandate the use of local remedies before claiming and allows recourse to the courts or tribunals of a launching State provided there is no duplication of Convention procedure and another specific one. In case diplomatic negotiations fail to settle the claim, according to Article XIV, either of the parties may ask for Claims Commission. The decision of the Claims Commission under Article XIX will be final and recommendatory unless the parties decide to make it binding. [3, arts. IX–XI, XIV, XIX]
In actuality, issues related to causation and liability could turn out to be contingent upon such things as command logs, telemetry, communications, maneuvering schedules, conjunction information and procedures that have been established for ensuring safety. In the case of servicing contracts, considerations like preservation of evidence, record availability, insurance and indemnification, interruption of services, dispute resolution and possible claims outside of the Convention need to be taken into account.
VII. Practical examples and the limits of precedent
MEV-1 is a model of cooperation in commercial servicing. MEV-1 made contact with Intelsat 901 on 25 February 2020. According to Intelsat, the satellite came back to work on 17 April 2020, after MEV-1 had taken control of its navigation and moved it to a new position. This example shows the significance of a previously agreed extension service. The case does not show how international law views such an unauthorized intervention since it was conducted through cooperation.
NASA’s OSAM-1 project was designed to demonstrate robotic servicing, which included refueling Landsat 7. NASA officially declared in March 2024 that it would terminate the project due to technical issues, high costs, and failure to find a reliable partner. The capabilities of the OSAM-1 project illustrate the need for regulations on consent, command and control and responsibility; the cancellation of the project does not create any precedent regarding these matters.
The case of Cosmos 954 involves radioactive debris that have landed on the territory of Canada. In 1981, the case ended in the conclusion of bilateral agreements between Canada and the Soviet Union regarding compensation for damages suffered. This incident is related to the issues of damages and inter-State settlement on Earth. Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as an on-orbit servicing precedent. The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case of Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay is devoted to cooperation and due diligence in a different regime of treaties. [8; 9, paras. 187, 197]
VIII. National regulation and non-binding standards
A national licence is a system used for authorization and regulation in the State. The guidance provided by the United Kingdom on operating orbital space objects, revised on 3 July 2026, says that an orbital operator licence may include the operation of a space object and activity in outer space. There are two ways of obtaining licenses based on the Space Industry Act 2018 and the Outer Space Act 1986. Statutes and regulation are laws; the GOV.UK webpage is the guidance on them. The fact that there is a license from the United Kingdom does not mean that there is consent of the operator and determination of the registry State’s participation.
The IN-SPACe function of authorization is captured by India’s Indian Space Policy 2023. The IN-SPACe Norms, Guidelines and Procedures for Implementation of Indian Space Policy 2023 in regard to Authorization of Space Activities (NGP), titled “IN:ISP2023:NGP2024/V1.0,” released in May 2024, delineates the activities that require authorization and the conditions for the same. The authorization certificate from the NGP restricts authorization to the particular activity set forth in its schedule, whereas the NGP’s satellite operation and conjunction guidelines focus on debris mitigation, conjunction assessment, and coordination with other satellite owners/operators. The relevant provisions apply to the authorized activities of India, but do not create an overarching rule of international law that authorizes interference with the foreign satellite. The Policy is a policy instrument, and the NGP is an authorization procedure; neither constitutes a catch-all statute which answers all issues of private consent.
The Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities were adopted by COPUOS in 2019. The relevant guidelines include B.1, B.2, and B.4, which cover the following topics respectively: updating contact information and information exchange; accuracy of orbital data and conjunction assessment while under controlled flight. These guidelines do not provide any right to seize, dock with, or move an object registered by another State.
- The regulatory gap
The legal regime is not empty. The treaties cover freedom of passage, state responsibility, authorization and supervision, jurisdiction and control, due regard, consultation, and specific forms of compensation for damages. The gaps are operational and relate to the application of the provisions to close approach situations, where the means of verification must be used when there is separation between ownership and operation, and in cases of multi-State and non-state actors.
There is also an issue of remedies. Conduct may be in violation of any relevant obligation even when it falls outside the definition of damage in the Liability Convention and fails to meet its other criteria for making a claim. Service outage and loss of economic value can occur without damage to physical property. Whether there is liability for conduct and a right to compensation are two different issues.
Sustainability must not be considered as an implied right to either dispose of another’s satellite or take any control over it. A satellite may still be owned, have sophisticated systems, and be subject to disposal procedures. While the decision might take into account that intervention may help in avoiding a possible collision, it also has to consider other issues such as authority, urgency and size of the risk, options available, and the interests of affected states or operators.
- A proposed consent-centered framework
The graduated scale below constitutes a proposed policy as well as good practice. It does not amount to a universal treaty requirement or to a description of a particular existing system of domestic licensing. The review process must depend on the risk involved, the physical impact of the activity on the target and the extent of the impact on the functioning or control of the target.
First, remote sensing and other low-risk activities must be evaluated under the relevant national authorization and due regard requirements, and where necessary under any notice or security provisions. The treaties do not provide that target authorization be obtained for each remote sensing mission. Second, a potentially dangerous close approach would be subject to a mission-specific risk assessment, coordination, designated points of contact, pre-established distances of separation (where appropriate), avoidance and abort plans. Third, docking, grappling, command access, refuelling and repositioning of another State’s space craft should normally require verifiable authorization from the person or entity in charge of such operation.
The regulator who adopts this proposal will be able to require the applicant to indicate the target and the State of registration, details of ownership, operating rights and command capabilities, proof of obtaining consent, details of planned commands and orbital modifications, assessment of risk of collision and creation of space debris, cybersecurity protection measures and emergency separation, and the maintenance of recorded time-stamped telemetry and communication records. In the event that the situation meets the requirements of Article IX, the State concerned must undertake or be able to seek the consultations set out under that Article. Inter-operator notifications and coordination can be accomplished by way of licensing, contracting and operational agreements.
Contracts should assign the risks of physical damage, service disruption, insurance, liability, command authority transfer, evidence access and dispute resolution. In the case of a claim of imminent danger, both operators and the States concerned will have to use all available emergency and diplomatic means to address the situation. Further work of COPUOS can address guidelines for meaningful consent, close approaches, non-physical interference and reasonable emergency measures.
- Conclusion
Orbital servicing may increase satellite longevity and promote sustainable operations in outer space, yet a purpose of in-orbit servicing or any claim of debris removal is not, in and of itself, enough to justify any interference with the space craft of another operator. The OST grants freedom of use while requiring duties of State responsibility, authorization and supervision, registration-State jurisdiction and control, and due regard. The Registration Convention aids in determining the State of registration and leaves room for agreement between launching States. The Liability Convention sets out guidelines for certain types of damage and an international process for claims between States.
An appropriate legal approach ensures that treaty provisions, authorization by States, private consent, and operational activities remain distinct issues. Article VIII is critical to jurisdiction and control and reiterates ownership in space, yet it cannot resolve all questions of who has the right to authorize servicing operations on its own. An approach which considers verified authorization, cooperation, and mission risk provides a way forward.
References and Legal Authorities
- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967, 610 UNTS 205. Direct source
- Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976, 1023 UNTS 15. Direct source
- Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972, 961 UNTS 187. Direct source
- Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, 2022 edition, art. 45 (Harmful Interference), read with the applicable Radio Regulations. Direct source
- International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, arts. 2, 4–11, 12, 31 and 55. Direct source
- Intelsat, “Intelsat 901 Satellite Returns to Service Using Northrop Grumman’s Mission Extension Vehicle” (17 April 2020). Direct source
- NASA, “Update on Status of NASA’s OSAM-1 Project” (1 March 2024). Direct source
- Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the settlement of the Cosmos 954 incident, signed 2 April 1981, CTS 1981 No. 8. Direct source
- Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, paras. 187, 197. Direct source
- Government of the United Kingdom, “Operating an orbital space object: rules and regulations” (published 21 October 2025; updated 3 July 2026). Direct source
- Government of India, Indian Space Policy 2023, especially sections 4–5. Direct source
- IN-SPACe, Norms, Guidelines and Procedures for Implementation of Indian Space Policy-2023 in Respect of Authorization of Space Activities, IN:ISP2023:NGP2024/V1.0 (May 2024), especially Chapters II, III and XI; read with subsequent applicable amendments and activity-specific directions. Direct source
- UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, UN Doc. A/74/20 (2019), annex II, guidelines B.1, B.2 and B.4. Direct source
Author: Velugubantla Umika
A Law student interested in legal research and writing